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UPOV 1978 and 1991 Many developing countries have started to introduce protection laws for plant varieties following the TRIPs Agreement of the World Trade Organisation (TRIPs = Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). Few countries have actually implemented their PVP-laws, but these are likely to come into effect during the coming years. Since also national (public) breeding programmes are likely to seek protection under these laws, more and more materials in PVS-initiatives will be liable to be affected. The implementation of Plant Variety Protection is depending on the national law and their implementation and likely to have a negative impact on the spread of varieties from a PVS programme unless the programme has an explicit license from the breeder. The UPOV Convention was developed in 1961, but has been revised several times, most recently in 1978 and 1991. It provides for PBRs or PVP \ over new varieties of plants. Since 1998, when UPOV 1991 entered into force, new parties to the Convention must adhere to the 1991 version, rather than that of 1978. Read more on the differences between UPOV 1978 and 1991. Differences between UPOV 1978 and 1991 There are significant differences between UPOV 1978 and UPOV 1991. UPOV 1991 generally creates a higher standard of protection for PBRs. One difference is that under the 1978 Act, a breeder is entitled to protection through being the "discoverer" of the new plant variety, whereas under the 1991 Act, mere discovery is not sufficient. Nonetheless, the criteria for “novelty” appear to emphasise commercial considerations, rather than testing for inventiveness. Under UPOV 1978, it was possible for farmers to practice the custom of saving and exchanging part of their harvest so as to have seed to plant for the following season, the so-called "farmers privilege". This is not expressly provided for under UPOV 1978, but its wording did not prohibit it, and this was the practice in many Member countries to the extent that significant ‘brown bagged’ seed could be traded. Under the 1991 Act, governments are expressly provided the discretion to decide whether or not to restrict a breeder's right: “In order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting... the protected variety... The 1991 Act also provides for exceptions for (a) acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes, (b) acts done for experimental purposes and (c) acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties, subject to specific conditions. Furthermore, it allows for the restriction of PBRs in the public interest. Another important development is the rule on "essential derivation" (EDV) in the 1991 Act. Under the 1978 Act any protected variety could be freely used as a source of initial variation to develop further varieties, so that such further varieties can be protected by the subsequent breeder without any obligation towards the breeder of the initial variety. Under Article 14(5) the 1991 Act, the essentially derived variety, which meets the normal protection criteria, may be the subject of protection, but it cannot be exploited without the authorisation of the breeder of the original variety. Some authors have expressed the concern that the determination of whether the new varieties are essentially derived from an earlier one is likely to be done through agreement between the breeders or litigation, rather than by the examination process. If this is the case, the relative bargaining strength of the breeders may become a factor that is to the disadvantage of developing countries. Finally, under UPOV 1978, any varieties eligible for PBRs protection could not be patented, whereas UPOV 1991 is silent on this question. As such, the possibility for double protection for plant varieties exists. For more information on the difference between the 1991 and 1978 version click here. UPOV Comparison Results sent in by others: Sent on 2007-04-17 21:35:55 by Humberto Gómez A system that confers a broader protection can be expected to encourage more innovation, which would end up generating more benefits for the society at large, in an equitable world all countries would benefit. However, there are considerable discrepancies among the countries in relation to their degree of development, and the UPOV system of PVP does not address these discrepancies, let alone properly. The consequences of not dealing with the discrepancies are that those countries under better development conditions can derive larger benefits from the UPOV system, but those other under lower degrees of development might not benefit at all, with the aggravation that there might be cases in which the balance could be negative. For example: countries with not effective variety development seed, production/distribution systems need to relay on traditional seed production/distribution all under informal settings with minimum monetary exchanges, where sharing or bartering could be the normal transaction forms. In these cases, restricting the open movement of the seeds could translate into a higher vulnerability of food security, by restricting the availability of the best seeds (from the best varieties) to the farmers their productivity potential is actually decreased. The UPOV system of PVP needs to adapt to the realities of the different stages of development of the countries, much like it is already being done with the essential pharmaceuticals needed to address diseases like AIDS, or to increase the rate of vaccination to lower the infant mortality rates. In this cases the owners of the IP for such products are waiving the stringent protection that the IP law system confer to them in the developed world, by doing this they are not going bankrupt, and they are contributing to raise the quality of life in those places. In the end that is more beneficial to the society at large than the economic payments not realized. Evaluated on 2007-04-18 00:00:00 by Niels Louwaars Humberto, I appreciate your analysis. You stress the need to allow for countries with different development stages to adapt their PVP system accordingly. I agree, but to add to this - different crops or farming systems within (!!) a country may need different protection levels. E.G. the flower industry in Colombia appreciates strong protection, whereas a legal ban on seed exchange may be counterproductive for food crops like beans or cassava. The UPOV system does allow for some differentiation, but only "upwards" , i.e. additional protection for certain crops/conditions.
Further - while you are critical on UPOV, please realise that the patent system provides a much stronger protection than UPOV!!!! so your arguments are valid even more for patent protection taht extend to varieties and seeds. Sent on 2007-04-26 19:27:23 by Emmanuel Okogbenin The 1991 UPOV act does look more of an improvement over the 1978 in granting more PVP. It is thus more stringent in granting protection on all criteria. Howver, I have reservations concerning two points on the issue of rights and exemptions. 1. Under rights, farmers priviledge is highly curtailed. This may work adversely against the interest of farmers in poor countries where poverty levels are still critical and where peasant farmers depend on their produce for income. 2. The EDV concept can be really complicated and could slowdown the process of having new varities released and this could be a great disadvantage. Emmanuel Evaluated on 2007-04-27 00:00:00 by Niels Louwaars Dear Emmanuel,
I agree with your analysis. The EDV concept is necessary to avoid 'cosmetic breeding' but I agre ethat it may give rise to problems int he implementation. However, officals granting breeder's rights are not involved in possible quarrels that may delay release of new varieties - it is the responsibility of the breeders of the new and of the original variety to 'fight it out'.
Niels Sent on 2007-05-05 14:08:41 by Carmen de Vicente The Act of 1978 was less restrictive. I assume that the need for the Act of 1991 resulted to correct situations of abuse, so as breeders and breeding companies are better protected. This seems more desirable because it encourages progress. However, this applies only to those countries that are under the UPOV system, right? What happens with those that are not? Related to the EDV situation, are there any accepted procedures to "fight it out"? If not, what about a new variety that just carries an introgression of a small chromosome segment with a desirable gene, as a result of marker-assisted selection? Evaluated on 2007-05-07 00:00:00 by Niels Louwaars Carmen,
I agree that '91 was developed with state of breeding/seed organisation of the UPOV members at that in mind (no developing countries except Argentina and South Africa). Due to political and trade pressures more an dmore countries now join, that may not benefit very much from the strengthened rules. Countries that are not a member . . . . are not boundby the rules!!!
The situation that you describe is a typical EDV issue. If the insert is expressed, the new variety can be protected as an independent variety. However, if the breeder considers that the new holder of the right only made a minor change, he can claim that the new variety is an EDV and that marketing of the seed requires his consent (and in practice a splitting of the market or a sharing of revenue. The PVP authorities are not party to this dispute. Sent on 2007-05-21 22:43:50 by Raj Kumar Niroula The 1991 UPOV act seemes to be an improvement over 1978. It is quite strigent in granting Plant variety protection. However, I found that this 1991 act restricts the farmers right, which is disadvantage to farmers of developing countries. Moreover, the concept of edv in 1991 act distracts the attitude of plant breeders, which brings quarellel among breeders and reduces the active colaborations in breeding programmes. Sent on 2007-05-30 10:29:00 by Feng Ling Fu I think the exemption entry,especially for futher breeding,it is more restricted for breeding workers. But this protect the commercial benifit of those organisation who success at first, I desire whether this situation would promote the monopoly, yes, this is very disadvantage to the followers. Sent on 2007-06-04 00:00:00 by Maria del Rosario Falcon Comparing the 1978 and 1991 UPOV Act. On the basis of my current practical experience, The most desirable act could be 1991 this suppose to have a higher standards of protection for PR of the breeders, this UPOV let the breeder that have a variety register be protected if some one else use this variety for breeding for a new variety and allow sharing rights. 1991 also provide exceptions for example is there are no commercial purposes, for experimental purposes or for specific conditions. Also 1991 there are more species protected But the national programs of the countries will be prepared for the amount of licenses for property rights? opy & paste your text in this box, or use the browse button below to send in a file. From UPOV 1978 to 1991: The Case of Kenya Until recently, all seed production in Kenya was the responsibility of the parastatal Kenya Seed Company (KSC), and no other commercial seed operations were allowed. KSC had exclusive rights to all varieties of the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and also established its own breeding program, principally for maize (and also wheat, pasture grass and sorghum). The policy shifted in the early 1990s, allowing the entry of MNCs (including from South Africa and Zimbabwe) selling hybrid maize (and to a lesser extent sorghum and sunflower). In addition, the policy change encouraged the development of a domestic seed industry. There are currently three seed companies (besides KSC) with their own breeding programs and several other small companies that produce and market seed of public varieties. KARI and KSC signed an agreement providing royalties to KARI for the use of varieties currently under KSC production, although some of the details of that agreement are still in doubt, including the degree to which KSC has exclusive access. KARI now assigns rights to its new varieties through a tendering process, in which KSC is expected to compete with other firms.The legal framework for IPR in Kenya was established in the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act of 1977 which was revised in 1991. Further details were defined in a supplementary issue of the Act in 1994. An office for administering PVP began functioning in 1998 and Kenya acceded to the UPOV convention in 1999. Much of the pressure for joining UPOV came from the horticultural industry, and the vast majority of the early applications for PVP in Kenya were from foreign breeders. A decision in 2001 provided an amnesty for extant public varieties, allowing them to be eligible for a full term of protection. This occasioned a great increase in PVP applications for public varieties, but the provision is controversial and has not yet been gazetted. Such varieties have thus not been issued with protection certificates. More recently, there is a move to make Kenya compliant with UPOV 1991; issues of particular importance are a more restrictive definition of essentially derived varieties (especially related to flower mutants and the possibility of the addition of a transgene to a protected variety) and greater control over farmer saving of seed of protected varieties (particularly the widespread practices of saving and local sale of wheat seed). The administration of PVP was initially assigned to KARI but in 1998 it was transferred to the recently established Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS) which also administers plant quarantine, crop variety release, seed quality control and certification, and pesticide residue testing. |